By David Criekemans, who teaches international politics, foreign policy and geopolitics at the University of Antwerp, University College Roosevelt in Middelburg and the Geneva Institute of Geopolitical Studies. He is also book series editor of ‘Geopolitics and International Relations’ at Brill De Gruyter
Donald J. Trump has returned as 47th President of the United States of America. Even before he enters office, the list of shocking statements is long; the desire to annex Canada as the 51th state of the United States, the aspiration to have the Panama Canal “returned” to the “American sphere of influence”, the renaming of the “Gulf of Mexico” as the “Gulf of America, the demand to bring Greenland into the US sphere of influence in the name of “the Free West”, the statement that Russia should be given a “neutral buffer zone” in Ukraine only to contradict himself partly later, the threats to Iran, or trade tariffs against China or even the European Union. Surely it takes Europeans some time to recover from so much geopolitical “shock and awe”. What is going on? Is Trump serious about all this? Will Europe bare the brunt?
Anyone who wants to understand Trump must use the prism of ego politics combined with a neo-classical variant of nineteenth-century geopolitics. All this is adapted to and embedded in the current zeitgeist, in which the battle for spheres of influence, resources and technology is central. The soup may never be eaten as hot as it is served. Nevertheless, we would do well not to laugh off all the US president’s threats in advance. Moreover, there is no real European strategy around how to deal with a rapidly changing world in which our most loyal alliance partner since 1945 has other geopolitical interests.
First, ego politics. This perspective argues that it is solely about Trump himself. Part of it can be understood as ‘transactionalism’ as described in 1987 in his book The Art of the Deal, which was, of course, an incredible bestseller like there has never been one before (acknowledging that is part of it). In this, every transaction, whether real estate in the small or large (geopolitical), is a zero sum game. That is, a process with a clear winner and loser. It comes down to being the winner. In fact, that is all that matters. What appears and how you come across is more important than reality. Besides, media man Trump knows better than anyone else that every 24 hours there is a new news cycle. The bottom line is to dominate it. That also generates clicks and likes in the attention economy. And that is money, which has made him big in classical and less classical media. Both need each other in a sense. No matter what is said, even if something is untrue, you deny and just keep going. Anything is afforded to get a deal, including putting other parties on the wrong foot. Preferably even so that people don’t really know what you actually want. Keep them guessing. In an ideal scenario, the other party will already be more accommodating in advance. Ideally, that other party will spontaneously present a possible deal of its own accord. Then the battle is already half won. In short, following exclusively the analytical prism of ego politics, we might be inclined to take all the ‘extraordinary’ statements of the 47th President with a grain of salt. But then we forget that the ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) movement has pretty much taken over the entire Republican Party by now. Their geopolitical narrative on channels like FOX is essentially not that different from what Russian citizens get to see.
Thinking about this paragraph from "The Art Of The Deal" by Donald Trump (1987) pic.twitter.com/nNsG9fo3Hc
— Jash Dholani (@oldbooksguy) November 6, 2024
Today, the US is doing much better than Europe on a lot of economic parameters, and is ready to increase its lead even more at the expense of those alliance partners. A first important conclusion is that Europe will only be taken seriously in today’s international relations if Brussels accelerates developing its own capacities in defence, technology and economy – especially in key sectors for the future. Only then will you be interesting and relevant. Meanwhile, the European Union built up a huge handicap compared to the United States on energy prices, competitiveness and (over)regulation. External geopolitical shocks such as Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping will force the Union to take decisive steps. In absence of those, Europe could quite quickly take an ugly fall in international relations. That would be perceived as weakness by other major powers. The doomsday image of a continent that could quite easily be divided among itself and played apart is not so theoretical.
"The Usual Rationales Can’t Explain the Depths and Length of the Digital Winter" in Europe, where only Luxembourg, Ireland (?), Norway and Switzerland are richer than USA in GDP per capita terms (PPP adjusted): https://t.co/3by0dBfcKz pic.twitter.com/2jL9zkGoYd
— Pieter Cleppe (@pietercleppe) April 22, 2024
You can nevertheless try to ‘guide egos’. A source of inspiration for Europe is how Japan’s now-deceased Prime Minister Shinzo Abe dealt with Trump during his first term in office. He managed to maintain the military alliance with Washington and avoid a tariff war. For this reason, Abe visited Trump early on, even before he became president. We see this happening now with the visit of Italian Prime Minister Meloni, among others. Incidentally, this also positions her as a bridge between Europe and the US. Abe was also willing to spend a lot of free time with Trump. He even suggested that Trump should actually be nominated for the Nobel Prize, like Obama. If things soon go wrong for Europe in Ukraine, we may well better tell Washington that Putin is actually laughing at Donald Trump square in the face. In short, ego politics is potentially playable through skillful diplomacy. Recently, Trump spoke out just before the start of his presidency to add Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal to US territories. The increased Chinese activities in the Far North and the Caribbean are a particular thorn in his side. Meanwhile, it seems that shortly afterwards, the Danish government quietly contacted the incoming Trump administration to offer the new president to expand the US military presence in Greenland (Source: Axios, 11 January 2025). This is European transactionalism in action. But again; Europe’s Achilles’ heel lies in its lack of substantial defence capabilities and technological innovations, as well as its limited scaling-up in peak economic sectors. Denmark but by extension also the European Union are currently far too weak in this. The Japanese example of a persistent charm offensive combined with accelerated expansion of material capabilities could be considered to turn Trump 2.0. into an opportunity. In the context of the broader geopolitical power struggle going on globally, a deepening of US-European cooperation in key sectors, from technology to energy and raw materials, offers important opportunities. Because going it alone will be difficult for the European Union, if not impossible in light of intensified geo-economic competition globally.
As for Europe’s lack of own investment in security and defence, the new US president has a valid point. Therefore, the current geostrategic shock can better be ‘exploited’. After all, the United States’ long-term strategic focus lies in the ‘Indo Pacific’. European countries will have no choice but to take more responsibility for their own continent in the context of burden-sharing. This could also be an opportunity for the renewal of our own economic fabric. After all, many new cutting-edge technologies from drones over A.I. to satellites or new polymers first emerge in the defence industry to subsequently generate commercial spin-offs. In some sectors, Europe will soon be unable to keep up unless we invest more structurally in them. Strengthening a European pillar within NATO can also offer a stepping stone to a more robust European defence of its own, which should be able to operate fully independently by the end of the 2030s, if necessary. We in Europe did not sufficiently use the ‘opportunity’ of Trump’s first presidency. This time there is much greater urgency given the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the increasingly clear ambitions of countries like China and Iran to redraw the international rules of the game not passively but actively. However, we need 15 difficult years to put those own defences in order. By then, the world may already look different geopolitically and it is not said that the US will be able or willing to help us in new security crises.
Second, geopolitics. At the present juncture, all world powers have something in common; they are worried about the future. Global struggles are unfolding in areas such as military might, technology, access to raw materials and energy, food and trade (routes). The just-in-time economy is partly being replaced by a just-in-case model. The global drive for more ‘strategic autonomy’ is creating a trend where macro-regional trade chains will grow in importance over global ones. Geopolitics is closely related to what goes on in the geo-economic and geo-strategic spheres. These three domains do not form separate compartments, but are closely interlinked. It is essentially a global struggle, with whoever is traipsing on the ground now in each of the above domains eventually falling fatally behind.
De "vrede" die sommigen zo graag wensen, komt eraan als U wil. Ze was nog nooit zo dichtbij. #waakzaamheid pic.twitter.com/AKYCDw80Nj
— David Criekemans (@DavidCriekemans) January 12, 2025
On the geostrategic front, there are currently three major ‘theatres’ relevant to the Trump administration; Ukraine, Israel versus Iran and the regional race in the Indo-Pacific with China. Trump’s senior envoy to Ukraine, former general Keith Kellogg, meanwhile, has already shifted the ambition from 24 hours to 100 days to find a “solvable solution”. It is all proving much more difficult than American voters were led to believe. For Europeans, a naked “land for peace deal” should be avoided at all costs. Moscow would then conclude that a limited European war could lead to results, and later repeat this in, say, the Baltic states. An ‘agree to disagree deal’ seems more realistic in which Kyiv loses the eastern regions such as Donetsk and Lugansk for the time being in exchange for Western security guarantees. However, the question remains how such a ‘peace’ along a 900-kilometre truce line can ever be verified. A ‘neutral zone’ in Central Europe does not seem realistic. Should Europeans then not demand exactly the same for former East Prussia – known today as the Russian geopolitical exclave of Kaliningrad, which was never Russian before 1945? Shouldn’t that region too then be completely demilitarised? In the Middle East, Trump will give a ‘free hand’ to Israel. With the recent military actions against Syrian air capabilities, Israel is now able to safely launch a military operation against Iran via its own air-to-air refueling tankers if necessary. The question in the Indo-Pacific is whether Trump will declare open support for Taiwan against China, as president Biden did.
On the geo-economic front, it remains to be seen what Trump actually wants to bring in with his “shock and awe” statements about trade tariffs against Chinese products of up to 60% and a flat 10-20% tariff against European products. The logic of transactionalism may apply here. In this, it will be important to convince the new US president, as indicated earlier, of the chances of a joint partnership. Meanwhile, the time gained should be used to the maximum to prepare for the chance that geo-economic fallout could nevertheless come in the form of restrictions or trade tariffs. Europe’s far too high energy prices, alongside overregulation, are one of the central problems in our competitiveness compared to the US. Europe needs to abandon once and for all the paradigm of ‘expensive energy’, on which all of our policy models are built. This can be done by putting more supply in the market, and this in all forms of energy. Reconciling climate goals with real industrial policy is crucial in this. Otherwise, we risk a cascading effect for Europe, with all the consequences for our social contract.
Geopolitically, in short, Europe faces urgent choices in which purposeful action must be taken. Strategic thinking is crucial to avoid paralysis and turn it into new opportunities.
Wonder why EU industry is uncompetitive? The EU's ETS climate tax (red) which comes on top of the gas price (orange) is higher than the USA gas price (blue). Europe's high energy price problem is made much worse by the EU's punitive climate policies. @BusinessEurope @Der_BDI https://t.co/Njz35BTBv9
— Pieter Cleppe (@pietercleppe) May 30, 2024
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